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I. INTRODUCTION
The legal system is no place for a child, but children are there
aplenty. The best the law can do is ensure that they are not alone. In
Florida, the law requires children to have at least one adult representa-
tive, usually a guardian ad litem,' to protect them and represent their
interests in court.2 Together, the guardian ad litem and the attorney who
represents the guardian have fought many battles in Florida's juvenile
courts-most notably those involving termination of parental rights.3
One battle involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the guardian
ad litem's role in pressing for termination of parental rights. In this case
the court upheld the guardian's role, however, if the guardian ad litem's
independent pursuit of termination of parental rights is someday found
to be in violation of the separation of powers doctrine, or is deemed
1. Literally, guardian "for the suit." "The name guardian ad litem has been applied widely
in most jurisdictions to identify the independent advocate for the child in child protection
proceedings." DONALD N. DUQUETTE, ADVOCATING FOR THE CHILD IN PROTECTION PROCEEDINGS
5 (1990). Throughout this comment, the term "guardian" will be used interchangeably with the
term "guardian ad litem," unless specifically indicated.
2. In 1963, Colorado became the first state to require the appointment of a guardian ad litem
in child abuse cases. Brian G. Fraser, Independent Representation for the Abused and Neglected
Child: The Guardian AdLitem, 13 CAL. W. L. REV. 16, 17 n.7 (1976). In 1988, Florida created a
Dissolution/Custody Project due to the increasing call for the appointment of guardians ad litem in
custody cases. Judy A. Fuller, Guardians Ad Litem in Custody Dispute Resolution.
Representation of the Child's Best Interests, 62 FLA. B.J., July/Aug. 1988, at 29. In 1990, the
Florida legislature allowed for the appointment of a guardian in divorce, custody, and visitation
proceedings. FLA. STAT. § 61.401 (1993). As of 1991, only Florida has enacted enabling
legislation authorizing the appointment of guardians in family law cases. See Barrett J. Foerster,
Children Without a Voice, 42 Juv. & FAM. CT. J. 9, 20 (1991). "Without the guardian ad litem,
the court is placed in the position of being the parens patriae of the minor child without any
support or assistance whatsoever." George A. Shahood, A View From the Bench: The Necessity
of the Guardian Ad Litem Program in Florida, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Apr. 1993, at 13.
3. This is a legal proceeding permanently freeing a child from his or her parents' custody, so
that the child can be adopted by others without the parents' written consent.
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unethical because of an inherent conflict of interest, then children risk
deprivation of meaningful access to the courts and the denial of their
constitutional right to be free from physical or mental abuse.
The use of a guardian ad litem to represent a child's interests in
court dates at least as far back as the Roman Empire.' Guardians exist
today, in large part, because the Federal Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment Act 6 requires states to enact legislation providing for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem in abuse and neglect proceedings in
order to receive certain federal funds.7 The federal law states that the
guardian ad litem should represent the child's best interests, but does not
specify who should represent the child in that capacity, nor does it
define the guardian's role and responsibilities.' The precise role of an
independent advocate for the child evolved from the common law. Over
the past two decades, a variety of legislative initiatives have codified this
role. As a result, there is little consistency among the states as to who
should serve as the guardian, what the guardian's responsibilities are,
4. Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991)
(recognizing a child's entitlement to be free from physical and emotional violence); accord
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 n.7 (1982) (recognizing "liberty interests of the child").
S. Charles P. Sherman, The Debt of the Modern Law of Guardianship to Roman Law, 12
MICH. L. REv. 124 (1913).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-07 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
7. The Act provides: "[T]hat in every case involving an abused or neglected child which
results in a judicial proceeding a guardian ad litem shall be appointed to represent the child in such
proceedings." Id. § 5106a(b)(6). As of 1976, neither the Act nor the rules and regulations that
implement it differentiate between a criminal court proceeding and a juvenile court proceeding.
Fraser, supra note 2, at 16.
In Florida, the legislature has mandated the appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent
the best interest of the child in any civil or criminal judicial proceeding involving child abuse or
neglect. FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1993); see also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215 ("The court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem to represent the child in any proceeding as required by law.").
Florida defines abuse and neglect as follows:
(2) "Abuse" means any willful act that results in any physical, mental, or sexual
injury that causes or is likely to cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional
health to be significantly impaired.
(37) "Neglect" occurs when the parent ... deprives a child of, or allows a child to
be deprived of, necessary food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permits a
child to live in an environment when such deprivation or environment causes the
child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired ....
FLA. STAT. §§ 39.01(2), (37) (1993).
For a further discussion of how other states define child abuse, see Fraser, supra note 2, at
19-20. Many states define a child as a person under the age of 18. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.01(7)
(1993).
8. In the 1994 reauthorization of the Act, Congress continued the requirement for the
appointment of a guardian ad litem to represent the child in child protection proceedings but
remained silent on the representative's duties. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(6) (Supp. 1994).
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and how conflicts should be resolved.9 As society becomes more com-
plex and the burdens on juvenile courts grow, questions regarding the
scope, role, and responsibilities of the guardian ad litem require
resolution.
This Comment examines whether this court-appointed special
advocate may independently file for and pursue termination of parental
rights without violating the separation of powers doctrine. It also exam-
ines the guardian's relationship to the judiciary and explores whether the
guardian's training in a judicially administered program makes it unethi-
cal for a guardian to independently litigate a termination proceeding
before a judge in juvenile court.
These issues have risen to the forefront in Florida in the wake of
Simms v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,' ° a case
recently decided by the Third District Court of Appeal. In Simms, the
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services ("HRS"), consented to
have the guardian's attorneys act on behalf of the State at the termina-
tion hearing. I The mother's rights were terminated after the trial court
found clear and convincing evidence of abuse, neglect, and failure to
comply with a case plan.' 2 On appeal, the mother argued that the oppos-
ing lawyers violated Florida's separation of powers doctrine by repre-
senting the guardian, a judicial officer, in a judicial proceeding without
the presence of the State. The Third District Court of Appeal took par-
ticular interest in this issue and during oral argument ordered a rehear-
ing. On rehearing en banc, the court specifically considered whether
any statutory or nonstatutory authorization for a guardian ad litem or
court-appointed officer to bring, maintain, or prosecute a proceeding for
termination of parental rights violated the separation of powers require-
9. CSR, Inc., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., National Study of Guardian Ad Litem
Representation 41 (1990).
10. 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d DCA) (en banc), rev. denied, 649 So. 2d 820 (Fla. 1994).
11. Id. at 960.
12. HRS was first alerted to a problem involving Samantha and Benjamin Simms in 1986
after they failed to return to the hospital for a follow-up visit for their daughter P's post-natal
jaundice. When they finally brought the baby to the emergency room a few days later, P. was
dehydrated, extremely jaundiced, and required hospitalization. P. was taken into HRS custody
and adjudicated dependent, but later returned to her parents under HRS supervision. P. was later
brought to the hospital at nine weeks of age with vaginal and rectal bleeding and diagnosed as
malnourished. In early 1987, the Simms' older daughter, 21-month-old M., fell from a balcony
and fractured her skull. The emergency room physician concluded the parents were guilty of
"gross neglect." A month later, P. was back in the hospital with a spiral leg fracture that was
indicative of an intentional injury. The doctors refused to release the children to the parents, and
on Mar. 27, 1987, the parents were taken into HRS custody. The Simms agreed to a case plan.
Despite three revisions over five years, they failed to comply. HRS and the guardian filed and
successfully pursued a joint petition to terminate parental rights. Prior to trial, the father
voluntarily relinquished his rights to the children and the case proceeded against the mother only.
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ment of Article II, Section 3 of the Florida Constitution.' 3
Part II of this Comment briefly summarizes the legal history of the
parent-child relationship. It examines the constitutional rights parents
have in the care, custody, and management of their children and outlines
the circumstances under which the state may suspend those rights. Part
III examines the "dependency" process, a process which starts with state
intervention to protect a child alleged to have been neglected, abused, or
abandoned, and which may ultimately lead to the termination of parental
rights.' 4 It explores the safeguards and procedures that are taken toward
the legislatively endorsed goal that children live in a permanent and safe
home environment and how Florida law incorporates that goal. Part IV
examines both the roles of HRS and the guardian in child protection
proceedings and, specifically, the guardian's relation to the Guardian ad
Litem Program. It analyzes the termination of parental rights proceed-
ings as "quasi-prosecutorial" and finds that the guardian ad litem and
HRS both have the statutory and common law authority to litigate termi-
nation of parental rights. Finally, Part V concludes that the guardian's
role as an independent advocate for a child in termination proceedings
does not violate the separation of powers doctrine, but there is a serious
potential for conflict of interest under the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.
II. PARENTS, THE STATE, AND CHILDREN
From the earliest comprehensive set of statutory enactments in
2150 B.C. 15 until 1874,16 the doctrine of parental absolutism flourished.
13. Before rehearing, the parties filed supplemental briefs. Concerned about the far-reaching
effects of this case on child advocacy, many amici curiae filed briefs. The Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit Guardian Ad Litem Program filed an amicus curiae brief, joined by the First, Second,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Eleventh, Twelfth, Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Eighteenth and
Twentieth Judicial Circuits. Also filing amici briefs were the Juvenile Justice Attorneys
Association with Legal Services of Greater Miami, the State of Florida, the Department of Legal
Affairs, and the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.
14. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 90 (Fla. 1980).
15. For a historical overview of the parent-child relationship dating from the Hammurabi
Code in 2150 B.C. to the present, see Brian Fraser, The Child and His Parents: A Delicate
Balance of Rights, in CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY 316-25
(R.E. Heifer & C.H. Kempe eds., 1976); Fraser, supra note 2, at 26; Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child
Abuse and Neglect Part I.- Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.
L. REV. 293 (1972).
16. Finally, in 1874 the state, its citizens, and the court seemed to take active
cognizance of the fact that a child did have the right of not being severely beaten
and cruelly and inhumanely treated. It was the dramatic case of Marvellen that
signalled: (1) that children do have a right of not being cruelly and inhumanely
treated; (2) the advent of and impetus for a number of privately funded charities
whose task it was to protect children; and (3) the beginning of an era that would see
every state adopt neglect statutes to protect children.
[Vol. 49:531
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Laws emphasized the powers of the parent. In particular, the child had
no status in the family or as an individual until the father accepted the
child. Children were economic units which could be sold or exchanged
freely. Infanticide of unwanted children was a common practice. Early
English law was generally no different. However, beginning in the late
twelfth century and continuing through the thirteenth, the law emanci-
pated children from parental control at the age of majority and gave
them the right to own property before reaching that age. 17 In connection
with the right to own property, children also received the remarkable
right to sue and be sued. " Court action was initiated by a court-
appointed "next friend" or an action was defended by a court-appointed
"guardian ad litem." In many cases, however, the court neither
appointed a "next friend" nor a "guardian ad litem." Rather, the court
itself assumed total responsibility for the protection of the child's
interest. 19
The last seventy years have seen the slow erosion of the doctrine of
parental absolutism and the emergence of the concept of presumptive
parental rights.2° American society functions under the assumption that
parents will act in their child's best interests and that the child's interests
and those of the parents are the same.2' Our legal system is premised on
this conviction.2 2 Case law has greatly limited state interference in child
care-related issues.23 In fact, the United States Supreme Court places
strong emphasis on family unity and autonomy, ruling consistently to
protect family privacy and internal decision making. 24 This philosophy
reflects the view that children benefit from a continuous intimate rela-
tionship with their parents,25 and that, generally, parents are in a better
position than outsiders to make decisions regarding their children's wel-
Id. at 324-5.
17. Fraser, supra note 15, at 320-21.
18. Once attaining majority, a child could bring an action against his custodian for
mismanagement of money or property that belonged to him. I WILUAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *462-63.
19. Fraser, supra note 15, at 321.
20. See Fraser, supra note 2, at 26.
21. Id. at 17-18.
22. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Robert A. Burt, Developing
Constitutional Rights of in and for Children, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer 1975, at 123;
Note, State Intrusion into Family Affairs: Justifications and Limitations, 26 STAN. L. Rav. 1383,
1383-87 (1974).
23. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165-66 (1944); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923).
24. See Bowen v. American Hosp. Ass'n, 476 U.S. 610, 627 n.13 (1986); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972); Parham v. J. R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979).
25. The individual family unit "offer[s] children protection and nurture, and introduces them
to the demands and prohibitions as well as to the promises and opportunities of society." See
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 7-9 (1979). It instills
1994]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:531
fare.26 The primacy of familial autonomy has protected the decision-
making authority rights of parents to this day. Although children's
rights are now recognized,27 parental autonomy still prevails in most
circumstances. 28
This premise does not maintain, however, that parental control is
absolute.29 Circumstances occur where protecting the child's welfare
becomes a more compelling interest than preserving family autonomy.3 °
This happens when the parent-child relationship deteriorates to a' point
where the child's welfare is compromised. One expert describes a
child's rights as negative legal rights because they come into being when
parental behavior drops below a minimal community standard.3 A par-
values, fosters religious and political beliefs, and provides a vehicle to develop in a child the
knowledge, education, and experience that will enable him to become a productive citizen. Id.
26. The nurtured family is a source of productive citizens. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E.
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503-04 (1977); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Natalie
Abrams, Problems in Defining Child Abuse and Neglect, in HAVING CHILDREN 156 (Onora
O'Neill & William Ruddick eds., 1979); GOLDSTEIN ET AT., supra note 25.
27. An important influence in recognizing children's right to representation was the United
States Supreme Court's decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). That decision recognized that
children are entitled to certain constitutionally guaranteed safeguards when their liberty is
endangered, including the right to independent counsel in some judicial proceedings. Id. at 41.
28. See generally Moore, 431 U.S. at 503-04 (recognizing constitutional protection of family
relationships because of their important role in our history and tradition as a nation); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding that "liberty" includes the right to establish a home
and bring up children). Contemporary cases, like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965),
suggest a concept of family autonomy, with emphasis on the importance of family integrity. Since
Griswold, family autonomy has sometimes been characterized as a fundamental, constitutionally
protected right. Drawn from language in that case as well as earlier cases, it is a personal right to
be free from state interference-for parents and children, separately and mutually-which arises
from the intimate family relationship. See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535
(1925) (limiting state's exercise of its parens patriae powers over family life and recognizing that
children are not mere creatures of the state); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944);
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974). Cf Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979)
(permitting parents validly to consent to child's commitment to state mental institution).
29. Insulation from state interference has never been considered absolute. When other
societal values are at stake, important competing state interests have overridden the authority of
the parent. Decisions such as Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-32 (1972) (education),
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (vaccination), and Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979) (abortion) are examples of areas where the Supreme Court has been willing to overcome
parental autonomy in support of other values deemed important by the state.
30. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (state has "urgent interest
in the welfare of the child"); In re W.D.N., 443 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). Before
intervening in family life to promote and protect the child's welfare, the state must show that the
parents are either unfit, unable, or unwilling to care for the child adequately. Quilloin v. Walcott,
434 U.S. 246 (1978); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S.
816 (1977); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). However, "the only limitation on th[e] rule
of parental privilege is that as between the parent and the child[,] the ultimate welfare of the child
itself must be controlling." Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
565, 570 (Fla. 1991) (quoting Sparks v. Reeves, 92 So.2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1957)).
31. Brian Fraser testified at committee hearings on the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act of 1974, and is credited with securing the bill's requirement of guardian ad litem
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ent is said to owe a duty of support to the child. If a parent fails to
provide adequate food, clothing, or shelter, he or she violates this duty
of care and support. The child is then said to be neglected, and the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court may be invoked. Only after parents so
grossly abuse their rights of care, custody, and control does the state
intervene and delineate a child's rights. If the state chooses to intervene,
however, it must rebut the presumption that favors parental rights.
In an effort to define the parent-child relationship more exactly, and
to insure the protection of minors' rights, the doctrine of parens patriae
introduced the state into the relationship.32  Traditionally, the state's
parens patriae power refers to its role as protector of those incapable of
assuring their own welfare.33 This doctrine allows the state, in limited
circumstances, to intervene in family life and remove children from the
custody of their parents. To intervene, the state must show an immedi-
ate and pressing danger to the child or to the state's interests. Our legal
system's long-standing preference for decentralized decisionmaking in
areas concerning family matters has tempered the implementation of the
parens patriae doctrine and has governed the state's authority to inter-
vene in family life. 34
Presumptive parental autonomy is premised on the theory that "any
person who is biologically capable of becoming a parent can become a
appointments. He was then staff attorney for the National Center for Prevention of Child Abuse
and Neglect. He has written many articles on this issue some of which are cited throughout this
Comment
32. The doctrine of parens patriae means, literally, "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 114 (6th ed. 1990).
This doctrine originally conceived in England, was formally adopted by the
American legal system. Noted specifically in 1839 in the case of Ex Parte Crouse
(".... rights guaranteed to the parent are granted by the grace of the state... "), and
specifically delineated in the case of Finley vs. Finley (... the responsibility to do
what is best for the interests of the child), it became firmly entrenched in the case of
Prince vs. Massachusetts (... parents may make martyrs of themselves but they are
not free to make martyrs of their children.. .
Fraser, supra note 15, at 326 (footnotes omitted).
33. Developments in the Law--The Constitution and The Family, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1157,
1198-99 (1980); e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts,
321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982); see also Andrew J. Kleinfeld, The Balance of Power Among Infants,
Their Parents, and the State, 5 FAm. L.Q. 64, 107 (1971); Note, A Case for Independent Counsel
to Represent Children in Custody Proceedings, 7 NEw ENG. L. REv. 351, 352 (1972).
34. "The right to the integrity of the family is among the most fundamental rights." Carlson
v. State, 378 So. 2d 868, 869 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1194 (Fla.
1989) (finding that the Florida Constitution requires the presence of a compelling state interest to
interfere in family unity). The parens patriae theory has been strongly criticized as a justification
for the existence of juvenile courts. The United States Supreme Court has found the
constitutional, theoretical, and historical underpinnings of the doctrine to be highly debatable.
E.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
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good parent, and that parents want and will act in their child's best inter-
ests."'35 However, current child abuse statistics indicate otherwise. In
1991, for example, states received and referred for investigation 1.8 mil-
lion reports of alleged child abuse and neglect involving an estimated
2.7 million children.3 6 The American Bar Association ("ABA") esti-
mates that a child is abused or neglected in this country every forty-
seven seconds and that forty children are killed or wounded by gunfire
every day.37 These figures suggest a crisis which not only jeopardizes
the future of every abused or neglected child, but the future of the entire
nation. This crisis has caused much concern.a
Indeed, it has become increasingly clear that child abuse and
neglect are social problems with long-term consequences. As a result,
states continue to refine and improve laws to protect children, while
enhancing their service systems to insure that abused and neglected chil-
dren and their families receive the help they need. 39 The legal system
35. Fraser, supra note 2, at 17.
36. NATIONAL CENTER ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., WORKING PAPER 2, NATIONAL CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT DATA SYSTEM 25 (1993).
37. Mark Hansen, Children's Summit, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1993, at 34.
38. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICA'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA
FOR LEGAL ACTION (1993) (discussing a recent study on the unmet legal needs of children and
their families); Robert W. Page, Family Courts: An Effective Judicial Approach, 44 Juv. & FAM.
CT. J. 1 (1993); see also Florida Children's Campaign Offers Facts, GUARDIAN AD LITEM
GAZETTE (Dade County Guardian Ad Litem Program, Miami, Fla.) June 1994, at 1 (urging all
political leaders to support a special session of the Florida Legislature to address the prevention
and early intervention needs of Florida's children); Jerri A. Blair, Gregory K. and Emerging
Children's Rights, TRIAL, June 1993, at 22 ("The U.S. Advisory Board on Child Abuse and
Neglect recently reported that ... the country's lack of attention to the problems of child abuse
and neglect constitutes a social, financial, and moral disaster.").
The Florida Supreme Court, in In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So.
2d 909, 911 (Fla. 1989), emphasized that steps should be taken to improve the juvenile process in
Florida. The court indicated that those steps should include efforts to:
[R]evise and update the Rules of Juvenile Procedure, amend the Rules of Judicial
Administration, make changes in the Judicial Council of Florida, commission a
study by the Judicial Council, increase the educational opportunities for judges and
lawyers in juvenile matters, and increase the scope of the Guardian Ad Litem
Program.
Id. Robert Benjamin would argue that these efforts miss the mark by focusing on the traditional
legal approach to child abuse, an approach he believes splinters and transforms the problem for
legal purposes and often furthers the breakdown of the family and harm to children. Mr. Benja-
min contends that "effective management of child abuse and neglect matters requires an approach
to problem solving that incorporates both the needs and protection of children and the mainte-
nance of the integrity of the family system." Robert D. Benjamin, Mediative Strategies in the
Management of Child Sexual Abuse Matters, 29 FAMILY & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 221, 223
(1991).
39. Rebecca H. Heartz, Guardians Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings:
Clarifying the Roles to Improve Effectiveness, 27 FAM. L.Q. 327, 330 (1993). In Florida, the
"[s]taff of the House Aging and Human Services Committee conducted statewide focus group
interviews with HRS staff, parents, foster care parents, guardians ad litem and judges for a two-
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has also become increasingly aware that children's interests in protec-
tion proceedings may be in direct conflict with their parents or the state
and, therefore, these children should be entitled to independent
representation.40
III. PROTECTING CHILDREN AND THE NEED FOR PERMANENCY
Juvenile Dependency Proceedings in Florida
Beginning about 1962, child abuse was formally identified as an
observable, clinical condition and recognized as a serious, widespread
threat to children's lives.4 t Individual states also began to enact
mandatory child abuse reporting statutes. Florida's mandatory reporting
law was enacted in 1963.42 Once an initial complaint is made, the juve-
nile dependency legal process is triggered. An HRS protective investi-
gator conducts an investigation and makes an assessment as to the
child's safety. If the child is found to be in immediate danger, the inves-
tigator takes involuntary temporary custody of the child and places him
year interim project." STAFF OF SENATE HRS COMM., 13TH LEG., 2D SESS., SENATE STAFF
ANALYSIS AND ECONOMIC IMPACT STATEMENT, CHILD WELFARE DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 10
(1994). Their findings and recommendations are contained in A Study of Performance
Agreements and Related Issues in the Child Welfare System (Dec. 1992). Id. This report served
as a basis for many of the provisions contained in House Bill 2409 which was passed into law
during the 1994 regular session and substantially amended chapters 39, 44, and 409 of the Florida
Statutes. The bill created the following changes to Florida's child welfare law which became
effective on Oct. 1, 1994: (1) new definitions to clarify the roles and rights of persons involved in
child dependency proceedings; (2) replacemept of performance agreements and permanent
placement plans with one case plan; (3) a requirement of a multidisciplinary case staffing for a
family whose child is at risk of placement in foster care; (4) encouragement of the use of
mediation; (5) improvement of notice requirements; (6) a requirement of a diligent search for
absent parents in preliminary child dependency proceedings; (7) allowance for the placement of a
child with an adult nonrelative approved by the court; (8) establishment of grounds and limitation
of the time legally terminating parents' rights when parents fail to comply substantially with the
case plan from 18 to 12 months; and (9) specification of factors to determine the manifest best
interest of the child. STAFF OF HouSE COMM. ON AGING AND HUMAN SERVICES, CHILD WELFARE
AND DEPENDENCY PROCEEDINGS 1 (1994).
40. In re Jamie "TT', 599 N.Y.S.2d 892 (App. Div. 1993) (ruling that children have a
constitutional and statutory right to "effective assistance of counsel" by law guardians in child
abuse and neglect proceedings); Heartz, supra note 39, at 330; Fraser, supra note 2, at 31-32;
DUQUETTE, supra note 1, at 7; Paula A. Monopoli & Nancy R. Palmer, Ethics and Advocacy:
Emerging Issues for Guardians ad Litem, FLA. B.J., Mar. 1989, at 42 ("The Juvenile Justice
Standards of the Institution of Judicial Administration, American Bar Association Joint
Commission on Juvenile Justice Standards (IJA-ABA standards) recognizes the right of children
to independent legal representation.").
41. Fraser, supra note 2, at 18.
42. FLA. STAT. § 415.504(1) (1993) (requiring any person having reason to suspect that a
child is being abused or neglected to report the situation to child protective services; specifically,
physicians, osteopaths, medical examiners, nurses, hospital personnel, health or mental health
professionals, law enforcement officers, school teachers, social workers, and day care center
workers).
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or her with a relative, if possible, or in an HRS shelter home.43  To
protect families and prevent unnecessary placements outside the home,
the law requires a shelter care hearing within twenty-four hours of a
child's removal from the home." At the hearing the court determines
whether placement in a shelter is in the best interest of the child, whether
there is probable cause that the child is dependent and thus in need of the
state's protection, and whether HRS has made reasonable efforts to pre-
vent the removal of the child from the home.45 If the court finds that it
is not in the child's best interest to be placed in a shelter, the child will
be returned to his or her parents immediately. If the statutory burden is
met, the child will remained sheltered. 46 At this point, the court may
appoint a guardian ad litem.47
Guardians ad litem are special guardians appointed by the court for
the limited purpose of representing the interests and rights of their wards
in the proceedings that gave rise to their appointment.48 In Florida, they
are lay volunteers49 who are trained in the workings of the juvenile jus-
43. Removal from the home and placement in shelter care is not considered until everything
possible has been done to meet the child's needs in her own home. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
REHABILITATIVE SERVICES, HRS MANUAL: FOSTER CARE FOR DEPENDENT CHILDREN, HRSM
175-12, at 1-1 (1991) [hereinafter HRS MANUAL]. Shelter homes are licensed private family
homes which receive children on an emergency basis from HRS. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. Rule
10M-6.015(3) (1993). It is designed as strictly a temporary arrangement (statutorily no longer
than two months) until further legal proceedings determine whether a child will be returned home
or moved into a foster home. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(9), (10) (1993). Foster homes, also licensed
private residences, are also temporary (statutorily no longer than one year), but they are designed
to provide substitute care for children who await rehabilitation of the situation which caused them
to be removed from the custody of their natural parents. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. Rule 1OM-
6.015(1) (1993).
44. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(8)(a) (1993).
45. Id. § 39.402(8)(b).
46. According to the HRS MANUAL:
The purpose of foster care is to: a) Provide a child with a substitute family-like
experience while away from his own family; b) Ensure that a child's rights to
emotional, physical and educational nurturing are protected; and c) Provide
adequate support services to a child's family in order that the goal of reunification
(or an equally appropriate permanent placement) will be reached as quickly as
possible.
HRS Manual, supra note 43, at 1-1.
47. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(8)(a) (1993) (requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem at the
shelter hearing "unless the court finds that such representation is unnecessary").
48. Guardians are usually dismissed from an appointment by the court when court
intervention ends. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(b)(3) (1993). "Guardians ad litem differ from general
guardians in that they are not responsible for the general care and supervision of either the person
or the estate of their ward or both." Regina T. Makaitis, Comment, Protecting the Interests of
Children in Custody Proceedings: A Perspective on Twenty Years of Theory and Practice in the
Appointment of Guardians Ad Litem, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 234, 234 (1978). The guardian ad
litem, due to the limited nature of the appointment, is generally not governed by the law of
guardianship. Note, Guardians Ad Litem, 45 IOWA L. REv. 376, 376 (1960).
49. In the early stages of implementing the guardian ad litem requirements of the Child Abuse
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tice system, educated about child abuse and neglect issues, family
dynamics, and community resources. In this capacity, they are also
taught interview and negotiation skills. "Guardians... are officers of
the court, who receive powers from the order of appointment to repre-
sent the best interests of the child."' 50 The responsibilities of a guardian
include conducting an independent investigation, reporting to the court
the wishes of the child, offering recommendations for actions which are
in the best interests of the child, and protecting the child from the harm-
ful effects of being entangled in the adversarial process.5 1 The guardian
ad litem is thus critical to the state's parens patriae function. z
The best interest principle,53 underlying all juvenile proceedings,
Prevention and Treatment Act, when a guardian was appointed, it was usually an attorney.
However, there was dissatisfaction among judges with the quality of attorney representation and
lack of direction among attorneys as to what they should do in fulfillment of the guardian ad litem
role. DUQUETTE, supra note 1, at 7.
It was against this backdrop that Judge David Soukup, in 1977, began using
trained lay volunteers in his Seattle court to fulfill the [guardian ad litem] role. The
volunteers' activities are monitored by a professional staff and attorneys are
generally present to represent the volunteer in the courtroom. The concept was both
successful and replicable such that it became a national movement known as Court
Appointed Special Advocates (CASA). By 1991 this movement grew to include
454 programs in 49 states serving 91,000 children.
NATIONAL CASA Ass'N, RULES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF GUARDIANS AD LITEM 4 (1992). How-
ever, according to the National Study of Guardian Ad Litem Representation, the vast majority of
appointed guardians ad litem are attorneys (72.4% of the jurisdictions use private attorneys, 21 %
use staff attorneys). Still, the volunteer models clearly excel as an effective model of representa-
tion. CSR, Inc., U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., National Study of Guardian Ad Litem
Representation 41 (1990); Heartz, supra note 39, at 339. The State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem
Program, the first statewide coordinated program in the United States, is strictly a lay citizen
volunteer program. The Florida Supreme Court decided on this model based on the results of a
1980 pilot program which evaluated the cost, quality, and effectiveness of representation by lay
citizens, public defenders, and private attorneys. ELLEN I. HOFFENBERG ET AL., STATE OF FLOR-
IDA GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM MANUAL, 20-21 (1985). The states requiring the guardian to
be an attorney have realized the attorney-guardian model frequently causes ethical problems when
the attorney is required to represent both the child's wishes as a client and the child's best inter-
ests. For a thorough examination of the conflicts and problems raised by this dual role, see Sarah
H. Ramsey, Representation of the Child in Protection Proceedings: The Determination of Deci-
sion-Making Capacity, 17 FAM. L.Q. 287, 288 (1983); Abigail B. Sivan & Mary Quigley-Rick,
Effective Representation of Children by the Guardian Ad Litem: An Empirical Investigation, 19
BULL. Am. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 53, 54 (1991); Merril Sobie, Representing Child Clients: Role
of Counsel or Law Guardian, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 6, 1992, at i; Steve Windsor, Children's Rights v.
Parental Rights: Representing Children in Family Law Cases, TEX. B.J., May 1993, at 480;
Jennifer Bellan, Comment, Appointing Counsel for the Child in Actions to Terminate Parental
Rights, 70 CAL. L. REV. 481, 497 (1982).
50. HOFFENBERG ET AL., supra note 49, at 21.
51. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(b) (1993). See also Foerster, supra note 2, at 16-18. For a more
thorough discussion of the guardian ad litem's role, see part III.
52. Jennifer J. Snider, Guardians Ad Litem: Speaking for the Child, 16 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 1253, 1261 (1990).
53. Florida law relies on the best interests of the child to resolve the conflict between the
rights of the child and those of the natural parents. Section 39.4612 of the Florida Statutes sets
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mandates that the child's well-being-not the parents', the family's, or
the child care agency's-must be paramount once justifiable state inter-
forth with specificity some of the relevant factors that may be considered by the court in
determining the manifest best interests of the child:
(1) The ability and disposition of the parent or parents to provide the child with
food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recognized and permitted
under state law instead of medical care, and other material needs of the child.
(2) The capacity of the parent or parents to care for the child to the extent that the
child's health and well-being will not be endangered upon the child's return
home.
(3) The present mental and physical health needs of the child and such future
needs of the child to the extent that such future needs can be ascertained based
on the present condition of the child.
(4) The love, affection, and other emotional ties existing between the child and the
child's parent or parents, siblings, and other relatives, and the degree of harm
to the child that would arise from the termination of parental rights and duties.
(5) The likelihood of an older child remaining in long-term foster care upon
termination of parental rights, due to emotional or behavioral problems or any
special needs of the child,
(6) The child's ability to form a significant relationship with a parental substitute
and the likelihood that the child will enter into a more stable and permanent
family relationship as a result of permanent termination of parental rights and
duties.
(7) The length of time that the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment
and the desirability of maintaining continuity.
(8) The depth of the relationship existing between the child and the present
custodian.
(9) The reasonable preferences and wishes of the child, if the court deems the
child to be of sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience to express
a preference.
(10) The recommendations for the child provided by the child's guardian ad litem
or legal representative.
(11) Any suitable permanent custody arrangement with a relative of the child.
FLA. STAT. § 39.4612 (Supp. 1994); see also Marshall A. Levin, Guardian Ad Litem in a Family
Court, 34 MD. L. REv. 341, 362-65 (1974) ("[T]he primary responsibility of the guardian ad litem
is to accurately present the true needs of the child and, thereby establish the 'best interest' test as a
suitable formulation for ensuring a child's welfare.").
The best interests standard is not without opponents. The standard has been criticized for
being indeterminate, unjust, and self-defeating. See Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against
the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1987) (arguing that the standard suffers
from these defects). See also Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Func-
tions in the Face of Indeterminacy, LAW & CoNTEMp. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 263 (citing a
study finding little agreement among some child welfare professionals regarding appropriate cus-
tody arrangements in the best interests of the child). The Supreme Court "more than once has
adverted to the fact that the 'best interests of the child' standard offers little guidance to judges,
and may effectively encourage them to rely on their own personal values." Lassiter v. Department
of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 45 n.13, reh'g denied, 453 U.S. 927 (1981). Courts determining
custody possess "unusual discretion to underweigh probative facts that might favor the parent.
Because parents subject to termination proceedings are often poor, uneducated, or members of
minority groups, such proceedings are often vulnerable to judgments based on cultural or class
bias." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762-63 (1982) (footnotes omitted); see also Mark
Strasser, Parental Rights Terminations: On Surrogate Reasons and Surrogacy Policies, 60 TENN.
L. REv. 135, 174-77 (1992).
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vention has been established. 4 The goal of the best interest standard is
to assure each child membership in a family with at least one parent who
wants him or her. Furthermore, this goal assures for each child and that
child's parents an opportunity to maintain or reestablish ties to each
other. If the state demonstrates that, within one year, reunification can-
not provide a child with the minimum requirements for a safe, stable
home, the law encourages adoption over foster care as a long-term
solution.55
After initially investigating a report of child abuse, neglect, or
abandonment, the law requires HRS to conduct a more thorough investi-
gation to determine whether court action is necessary. 6 If it appears
that there has been actual maltreatment, HRS files a dependency peti-
tion.57 A dependency proceeding is a civil action in which a circuit
court determines whether the person who is responsible for a child is
adequately providing for that child's welfare. 8 If HRS chooses not to
file a petition, any person who has knowledge of such maltreatment,
including the guardian on the case,59 may proceed with court action if
that person believes it is in the best interest of the child.60
Once HRS, or another party, files a petition in juvenile court, the
child, for all practical purposes, becomes a ward of the court. The court
thus has the responsibility to protect that child's safety and interests.6'
This places judges in the somewhat awkward position of protecting the
54. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 25, at 4-6.
55. FLA. STAT. § 39.45(2) (Supp. 1994). According to the statute,the legislature intends that:
[E]ach child be assured the care, guidance, and control in a permanent home which
will serve the best interests of the child's moral, emotional, mental, and physical
welfare and that such home preferably be the child's own home or, if that is not
possible, an adoptive home [and] that permanent placement with the biological or
adoptive family be achieved as soon as possible for every child in foster care and
that no child remain in foster care longer than one year.
Id.
56. FLA. STAT. § 309.403(2)(a) (1993). A reported case could be handled nonjudicially, for
example, when parents voluntarily agree to counseling or HRS decides that the complaint of abuse
is unfounded. Id. § 309.403(2)(b).
57. A petition is a simple document which states the name of the child, the nature of the
maltreatment, and the alleged abuser. Based on the 1990 amendment to section 39.01(10),
dependency may be based on allegations against a custodial parent, eliminating the requirement of
allegations against both parents. In re L.S., 592 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
58. FLA. STAT. 39.01(10), 39.40(2), 39.409 (1993).
59. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.310(a)(1) (1993); In re F.B., 534 So. 2d 899
(Fla. 5th DCA 1988).
60. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(1) (1993). This section provides that "[a]ll proceedings seeking an
adjudication that a child is dependent shall be initiated by the filing of a petition by an attorney for
the department, or any other person who has knowledge of the facts alleged or is informed of them
and believes that they are true." Id.
61. Brian Fraser & Harold P. Martin, An Advocate for the Abused Child, in CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: THE FAMILY AND THE COMMUNITY, supra note 15, at 172.
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child's interests, and, at the same time, weighing both sides of the argu-
ment and reaching a fair decision.62 If judges actively advocate for the
child, they lose their impartiality. To resolve this dilemma, judges may
transfer their obligation to protect the child's interests by appointing a
guardian ad litem. This appointment does not negate the court's respon-
sibility to the child; instead, it allows the court to fulfill that responsibil-
ity in a less compromising manner.63 Through the appointment, the
guardian ad litem assumes the role of an officer of the court, who is
responsible to both the child and the court.64
The court then holds an arraignment hearing,65 in which the parents
admit to, consent to, or deny the allegations in the petition. The court
also determines whether the parties are represented by counsel or are
entitled to appointed representation.6 6 If the parents admit to the facts in
the petition alleging dependency, the court then proceeds to a disposi-
tional hearing. If they deny the allegations, an adjudicatory hearing
must be conducted.67
A judge conducts an adjudicatory hearing, without a jury, to deter-
mine whether the allegations of the petition are supported by a prepon-
derance of the evidence.68 If the guardian and HRS do not agree on a
resolution of the case, the guardian may be represented by an attorney,
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. Donald C. Bross, Helping Prevent the Abused Child From Becoming a Grownup
Abuser, THE JUDGES' J., Fall 1985, at 11, 14-15.
65. After a petition is filed, an arraignment must take place within 14 days after the child is
detained pursuant to court order, FLA. STAT. § 39.408(1)(a), or within a reasonable time if the
child remains at home. Id.
66. Throughout a dependency proceeding the parent or custodian of the child has a right to
counsel. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320(a)(1). Upon request, the court must appoint counsel to insolvent
persons, provided they are entitled to counsel under other Florida law. Id. at R. 8.320(a)(2). The
court also must ascertain whether the parent or custodian understands the right to counsel. Id. at
R. 8.320(a)(3).
67. If the child is in custody, the adjudicatory hearing must be held within seven days from
the date of the arraignment. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(l)(a) (Supp. 1994). However, even if this
seven-day period has not yet expired, the child must be released from the state shelter after 21
days have elapsed from the time the child first was taken into custody unless an order of
adjudication has been entered, or a continuance has been granted. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(9) (1994).
Every month in Dade County, between 90 and 120 shelter hearings are conducted, an infusion that
has pushed to 3000 the number of children in foster care. Because of this volume, the 21-day rule
is rarely followed. Interview with Helen Stone, State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program
Attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in Miami, Fla. (Mar. 5, 1994). A guardian can seek a
continuance by motion filed with the court, especially where there is evidence the child would be
endangered if released to the parents. In re Unknown P., 546 So. 2d 21, 23 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
68. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2)(b) (Supp. 1994); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.330(a); Moore v. State, 452
So. 2d 1059, 1060 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); In re R.H., 516 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).
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usually a volunteer.69 Counsel also represents the parents.7 ° Witnesses
may testify and be cross-examined, and the rules of evidence used in
civil cases apply. 71 Florida law defines "abuse" as "any willful act that
results in any physical, mental, or sexual injury that causes or is likely to
cause the child's physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly
impaired, '72 and "neglect" as depriving a child of "necessary food,
clothing, shelter, or medical treatment or permitting a child to live in an
environment when such deprivation or environment causes the child's
physical, mental, or emotional health to be significantly impaired.
73
HRS must, therefore, prove serious impairment to the child.
If, at the close of the petitioner's case, the court finds insufficient
evidence to warrant a finding of dependency, it may dismiss the peti-
tion.74 The child is then returned to the parents. Should the court find
that the allegations of the petition are supported by a preponderance of
the evidence, it must make a finding of dependency. 75 The case is then
scheduled for disposition.
The next stage in the dependency proceeding is the dispositional
hearing,76 at which time the court determines where the child should be
placed pending resolution of the family's problems 77 and determines the
services to be provided to the child and family. At this hearing, the
court may consider any evidence helpful in determining the proper dis-
69. GUARDIAN AD LITEM PROGRAM, STATE COURTS ADMINISTRATOR, IN THE CHILDREN'S
BEST INTERESTS, A MANUAL FOR PRO BONO ATTORNEYS WHO ASSIST GUARDIANS AD LITEM 6-6
(1991) (hereinafter PRO BONO MANUAL].
70. The court is required to appoint counsel for indigent parents where permanent termination
or child abuse charges might result. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 91 (Fla. 1980).
71. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(2)(b) (Supp. 1994); see Davis v. Page, 442 F. Supp. 258, 260 (S.D.
Fla. 1977).
72. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2) (1993).
73. Id. § 39.01(37).
74. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.330(0; In re C.C., 556 So. 2d 416 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (finding
single incident in which mother struck, shook, and intimidated two-year-old insufficient to show
dependency).
75. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.330(g).
76. The dispositional hearing can be held at any reasonable time, but the statutes expressly
provide that the child cannot be held in a shelter for more than thirty days after the entry of an
order of adjudication. FLA. STAT. § 39.402(10) (Supp. 1994). Thus, as a practical matter, all
disposition hearings are held within this time limit. PRO BONO MANUAL, supra note 69, at 5-24.
77. The court places the child under the protective supervision of HRS in the child's own
home or in the temporary legal custody of an adult relative or an adult nonrelative approved by the
court who is willing to care for the child. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(4). The court may also commit the
child to a licensed foster home willing to receive the child, id. § 39.41(7), to the temporary legal
custody of HRS, id. § 39.41(8), or to an independent living arrangement for a child 16 years of
age or older. Id. § 39.41(10).
The court can impose any reasonable restrictions it deems proper. Protective supervision
must continue until the court terminates it or the child reaches the age of 18, whichever occurs
first. FLA. STAT. § 39.41(3) (Supp. 1994).
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position.78 Florida law requires HRS to prepare a predisposition
report. 79 This report assesses the risks and benefits of returning the child
home, including all the reports and recommendations from the profes-
sionals and agencies that have provided services to the family. It also
determines the availability and appropriateness of prevention and
reunification efforts made by the department. 80 The HRS predisposition
report then recommends specific actions.
In most jurisdictions, the disposition hearing focuses on developing
a case plan that sets forth the actions to be taken by the parents, the
agency, and other professionals to achieve the goal of rehabilitation of
the family unit.8 1 The purpose of the plan is to quickly assure the safe
return of the child to the parents, or if this is not possible, the termina-
tion of parental rights and the placement of the child with HRS or a
licensed child-placement agency to find a permanent adoptive home.82
When a case plan is agreed upon, all parties sign it and retain a copy.8 3
78. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.340(a).
79. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(3) (1993). Guardians routinely prepare a predisposition report as
well. The guardian's report includes a statement of the child's wishes and of what the guardian
believes is in the best interest of the child. Predisposition reports cover the child's needs and
include recommendations which usually address such issues as whether visitation with parents
should be supervised or unsupervised, therapeutic treatment for children and parents, referral for
evaluation for special school programs, medical screening or treatment, psychological evaluations,
and drug or alcohol dependency treatment for parents. The weight given to the child's wishes
depends on the age of the child and his or her wishes. The expressed preference of a child of
sufficient intelligence, understanding, and experience is given more weight than that of younger
children (unless the younger child expresses terror at the proposition of being placed in the
custody of a certain person), especially if the child is old enough and threatens to run away.
Usually, judges seriously consider the guardian's recommendations because they know that the
guardian ad litem typically takes one case at a time and therefore has devoted considerably more
time than HRS to the fact-finding and social aspects of the case. Interview with Cindy Lerner,
State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in Miami, Fla.
(Aug. 17, 1994).
80. FLA. STAT. § 39.408(3)(a) (Supp. 1994). HRS must report on what services were
provided and whether they were sufficient to meet the needs of the child and family. The report
recommends what services should be continued and must explain why needed services have not
been provided, if any. Id. If placement outside the home is recommended, the report must state
the specific length of time before custody by the parent will be reconsidered. Id. § 39.408(3)(b).
In re K.S., 558 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
81. By law, HRS must offer a case plan within thirty days of the disposition hearing. FLA.
STAT. § 39.451(4)(a) (1993). The case plan is written in layman's terms by the agency
responsible for placement, in conference with parents, foster parents, the child, and the guardian
ad litem. The plan is a contract under which the parent(s) and HRS must participate in certain
HRS sponsored programs, such as substance abuse programs or classes on parenting skills. One
court has described the case plan as embodying the standards the parent must meet to obtain a
legitimate expectation of reconciliation with the child, as well as the standard by which the
decision to terminate parental rights will be judged if the parents fail. In re A.B., 444 So. 2d 981
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
82. FLA. STAT. § 39.451(1).
83. Id. § 39.451(4)(d). If the parents are unwilling to participate in the development of a case
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The court enters an order approving or modifying the.plan and it then
becomes an order of the court.
Parents are typically given up to one year in which to "substantially
comply" with the plan.84 The time period can be extended when good
cause is shown. Every six months the court reviews the case plan to
determine whether it has been properly implemented and whether it is
achieving the desired effect.85 Central to the review is whether any
additional actions should be taken by the parent or agency to correct the
conditions that caused the child to be removed from the home.86 The
review hearing also determines whether all parties are complying with
their designated tasks and responsibilities and whether the risks to the
child have been ameliorated to the extent that the child can be returned
home safely.8 7
According to Florida law, the case plan expires no later than eight-
een months after the date the child was first removed from the home,
unless it is extended.88 Unless efforts to rehabilitate the family are suc-
cessful, the eighteenth month judicial review hearing formally marks the
point at which HRS shifts its focus from rehabilitation and reunification
of the family to finding a stable and secure permanent home for the
child 9.8  The institution of these eighteen month reviews is based on two
plan, one is prepared according to the requirements in the statute and provided to the parents. Id.
§ 39.4031(5).
84. The Florida legislature, in 1994, decreased the time from 18 to 12 months. Id.
§ 39.464(1)(e).
85. See id. § 39.453.
86. The parents are given a fair opportunity to correct the problems that brought the child
before the court. DUQUETrE, supra note 1, at 87.
87. Id. During the 1994 regular session, the Florida legislature added the following language
to the judicial review provision:
If, at any judicial review, the court finds that the parents have failed to substantially
comply with the case plan to the degree that further reunification efforts are without
merit and not in the best interests of the child, it may authorize the filing of a
petition for termination of parental rights, whether or not the time period as
contained in the case plan for substantial compliance has elapsed.
FLA. STAT. § 39.453(8)(e) (Supp. 1994).
88. Id. § 39.451(2).
89. DUQUETrE, supra note I, at 95-96. If, at the time of the eighteenth month judicial review
hearing, the parents have not sufficiently complied with the plan so the court may not safely return
the child to the physical custody of the natural parents, HRS is required to initiate termination of
parental rights proceedings within 30 days. FLA. STAT. § 39.454(2). The case plan, however, may
be extended if there are extraordinary circumstances and the best interests of the child are served.
This seemingly harsh mandate is the legislature's response to "foster care drift" and the perceived
lasting harm it causes children. "The Legislature finds that 7 out of 10 children placed in foster
care do not return to their biological families after the first year and that permanent homes could
be found for many of these children if their status were reviewed periodically and they were found
eligible for adoption." FLA. STAT. § 39.45(1) (Supp. 1994); see John P. Christoff, Children in
Limbo in Ohio: Permanency Planning and the State of the Law, 10 J. Juv. L. 73, 75 (1986).
In addition, when determining whether to terminate parental rights, the court must consider
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fundamental beliefs. First, the law must make the child's needs para-
mount. Second, permanency in relationships is critical to the child's
developmental needs.90
In extreme cases, the end result of the dependency process is the
filing of a petition to terminate parental rights.9' Although state action
whether maintaining the continuity of present arrangements is in the child's best interest, as well
as the likelihood that the child will enter into a more stable and permanent family relationship
through the termination of parental rights and duties. FLA. STAT. § 39.4612(6), (7). Finally, the
court considers evidence of a parent's failure to comply with a case plan in conjunction with the
evidence of abuse or neglect. See In re J.L.C., 501 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); Spankie v.
Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs., 505 So. 2d 1357, 1358 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987)
(terminating mother's parental rights based on finding of failure to comply with performance
agreement and a history of physical and emotional abuse inflicted on the child by the mother).
90. After years of study and debate about the nation's child welfare and foster care system,
Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (Child Welfare Act).
42 U.S.C. § 675 (1980); DUQUETrE, supra note 1, at 95. Congress wanted to encourage states to
adopt legal reforms which would reduce the number of children placed in foster care by protecting
children at home with their natural parents if at all possible. S. REP. No. 336, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1450. The intention of the law was to ensure that when
a child was removed from the biological family, the rehabilitative services were focused on the
family in a fairly short period of time (less than 18 months) so that the child could quickly return
to the biological family, if possible. For a sobering look at "foster care drift", see Marsha
Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. Rv. 423 (1983). Studies show that the
loss or absence of a continuous, permanent relationship with a parental figure is associated with
higher rates of juvenile delinquency and psychological disturbance. Id. at 424. Congress
conditioned state eligibility for federal foster care funds on the state's enactment of certain
procedures. Among the federal requirements of the Child Welfare Act is that the state hold a
permanency planning hearing (in Florida, a judicial review), after a child has been in foster care
for 18 months. These reforms were drawn from the psychoanalytic theories presented by the
renowned trio Joseph Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit in their 1973 book, Beyond the
Best Interests of the Child. See id. at 446-47. For a discussion of evidence that undermines their
theses, see Garrison, supra, at 457. Most states, by statute, court rule, or administrative procedure,
have adopted the federal procedures. Florida legislation stresses the need to find a permanent
solution within definite time frames. FLA. STAT. § 39.45 (Supp. 1994). Despite the good
intentions of legislators, the federal goal of 18 months (never mind Florida's 12 month goal) is an
impossible dream.
In 1990, a Miami attorney representing six Dade County foster children charged HRS with
routinely failing to comply with the 18 month limit. The statistics provided for the lawsuit
showed that 81% of the children in foster care remained there over 18 months, spending an
average of 28.8 months in the system. To settle the lawsuit, a one-time allocation of $36 million
was injected into the foster care system. The author questions if this is nothing more than a band-
aid. See In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909, 909-10 (Fla. 1989)
("[I]n spite of herculean efforts by the courts, the Department of HRS, the guardians ad litem and
others, the dependency system is simply unable to dispose of these cases within the statutory time
limits for processing children through emergency shelter and foster homes."); William Cooper Jr.,
Settlement Reached on Foster Care, PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 11, 1992, at IA.
91. A petition to terminate parental rights cannot be filed if the failure to comply with the
case plan was due to the lack of financial resources of the parents or the failure of the department
to make reasonable efforts to reunify the family. FLA. STAT. § 39.494(l)(e) (Supp. 1994). A
termination petition may also be filed prior to expiration of a case plan if a parent engages in
conduct toward a child that demonstrates that the continuing involvement of the parent in the
parent-child relationship threatens the life or well-being of the child, irrespective of the provision
of services. Id. § 39.494(l)(c). A termination petition may also be filed (without first having filed
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to terminate parental rights represents perhaps the most drastic legal
intrusion into the sanctity of family life,92 Florida law recognizes that
the ultimate welfare of the child must take precedence.93
Similar to the dependency petition filing process, any person who
has knowledge of abuse, neglect, or abandonment may file a termination
petition.94 Furthermore, if a guardian ad litem has not previously been
appointed, the court must appoint one when a termination petition is
filed. In a termination proceeding, the petitioner must prove three
things: first, that the original allegations of maltreatment satisfy the
higher standard of clear and convincing evidence; second, that the par-
ents failed to comply substantially with the case plan; and third, that
termination is in the best interests of the child.95 HRS must also plead
and prove that it employed diligent efforts to rehabilitate the parents.
Expedited termination proceedings, which permit the filing of a petition
a dependency petition) when a parent engages in (or fails to prevent) egregious conduct that
endangers the life, health, or safety of a child. Id. § 39.494(1)(d). Egregious abuse is defined as
"conduct of the parent or parents that is deplorable, flagrant, or outrageous by a normal standard
of conduct." Id. § 39.494(l)(d)(2). A termination petition may also be filed if the parents
voluntarily relinquish custody of their child to HRS or to a licensed child-placing agency, id.
§ 39.494(1)(a), or when the identity or whereabouts of the parent(s) are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent search within 60 days. Id. § 39.464(l)(b). See generally Garrison, supra
note 90. Garrison persuasively argues that although the child's need for permanence may justify
depriving her parents of the right to regain custody, forever prohibiting visitation with the child's
natural parent generally does the child more harm than good.
92. "An order of termination of parental rights... permanently deprive[s] the parents or legal
guardian of any right to the child." FLA. STAT. § 39.469(2)(b) (1993). The effect is to sever
completely and irrevocably both the parent's right to ever regain custody and the right ever to visit
or communicate with the child again.
93. See, e.g, FLA. STAT. § 39.001(1)(b). On the other hand, a recent article in a Miami
newspaper notes that:
Some child advocates now argue that the standard used to terminate parental rights
(i.e., abuse, neglect, or abandonment) should be broadened to address the issue of
who is best suited to raise a child. "My own view is that parents don't have rights to
a child," says William Gladstone, a retired juvenile court judge. "They have
obligations, and if they meet those obligations, then they have the privilege of
children."
Steve Almond, A House Divided, MiAMi NEw TIMEs, Mar. 3-9, 1994, at 30.
94. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1) (Supp. 1994). In 1994, the Florida Legislature engaged in a major
revision of Chapter 39, Florida Statutes. One notable change is that § 39.461 no longer mandates
that a termination petition be filed by an HRS attorney or by any other person with knowledge;
instead, the statute now specifically grants this power to the guardian ad litem, courts had accepted
termination petitions filed by guardians even before the statutory revision. See Norris v. Spencer,
568 So. 2d 1316, 1317 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (court-appointed guardian of a minor child had
standing to file a petition for termination of parental rights); In re C.B., 561, 666 So. 2d 663 (Fla.
5th DCA 1990) (court-appointed guardian, without participation of HRS, could initiate and litigate
a petition for termination of parental rights); In re J.M., 560 So. 2d 343 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)
(maternal grandparents had right to file and pursue a petition for dependency without consent of
HRS); Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780, 783 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
95. See part IV, for a thorough examination of the termination process and the roles of HRS
and the guardian.
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without having to prove dependency or failure to comply with a case
plan, are available in three limited situations: voluntary relinquishment,
abandonment for sixty days, or egregious conduct.96 If the grounds for
termination 97 are not proven by clear and convincing evidence, but
grounds for dependency have been established, the court must deny the
termination petition and enter an order either placing or continuing the
child in foster care under a case plan, or returning the child to the par-
ents.98 If the judge orders the parents' rights terminated, HRS or a
licensed child-placement agency obtains permanent legal custody of the
child.99 The child then is freed for adoption and eventually may be
placed in a permanent adoptive home or some other long-term
arrangement.
IV. HRS, THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM, AND THE GUARDIAN AD LITEM
PROGRAM
The state acts as parens patriae through its legislative, executive
and judicial branches.'0° Its executive function is performed by the
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services.101 The legislature
established HRS to "prevent[ ] or remedy[ ] the neglect, abuse, or
exploitation of children and of adults unable to protect their own inter-
ests"' 0 2 and "to integrat[e] the delivery of all health, social, and rehabili-
tative services."' 0 3 HRS's primary obligations are to insure the safety of
children, to help the family to prevent its break-up, and to reunite the
family if the child has already been removed.'0 4 HRS usually takes
legal custody of a child no matter who files or argues the dependency or
termination petition.105  If HRS's diligent efforts to keep a child in the
natural parent's care fail, the agency's duty switches from trying to
96. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(2) (Supp. 1994).
97. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
98. The court retains jurisdiction over a child returned to the parents for a period of at least
six months. FLA. STAT. § 39.469(1)(a).
99. Id. § 39.469(2).
100. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 445-47 (1945).
101. HRS is an administrative agency, which renders it a part of the executive branch, and is
defined statutorily as "the principle administrative unit within the executive branch of state
government." FLA. STAT. § 20.03(2) (1993).
102. FLA. STAT. § 20.19(1)(a)(3) (1993).
103. Id.
104. See HRS MANUAL, supra note 43, at 1-1, 5-1.
105. When a child is first taken from the home, HRS takes temporary custody of the child. Id.
at 1-5. It is responsible to for the day-to-day care of the child, including the provision of food and
shelter, clothing, education, medical care, and emotional support. Id. at 1-9. When a parents'
rights are terminated, HRS then takes permanent custody so that the child may be adopted.
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repair the parent-child relationship to terminating it. 10 6
HRS has many other important considerations in the execution of
its duties. While intervening to protect and promote a child's well-
being, the agency is still responsible for assisting the parents in exercis-
ing their legal rights and responsibilities. °7 While IRS endeavors to
reduce its administrative overload of dependency and termination pro-
ceedings, it also maintains an interest in lessening the financial burden
of keeping children in state custody.' 08 It is no secret that social service
agencies are inadequately funded. 1 9 HRS in Florida is no exception. In
Dade County alone, hundreds of children linger in foster care far beyond
the statutorily permitted time limit because HRS does not have the
budget to hire adequate staff to bring termination actions."I 0
Like the executive branch, the judicial branch is also instilled with
the state's parens patriae power. In Florida, and throughout the United
States, courts of equity possess the inherent authority to protect chil-
dren"'. and to appoint guardians when legal proceedings affect chil-
dren's rights." 2 Today in Florida, the legislature and the supreme court
require judges in juvenile court to appoint guardians ad litem' 13 to repre-
106. FLA. STAT. § 39.454(2) (Supp. 1994); Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S.
18, 39 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. HRS MANUAL, supra note 43, at 5-15.
108. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
109. E.g., Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
834 n.35 (1977) (state agencies' understaffing and underfunding tend to discourage family
reunification).
110. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
111. E.g., McRae v. McRae, 52 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 1951); Pollack v. Pollack, 31 So. 2d 253 (Fla.
1947). The common law considered minors to be wards of the court. E.g., Krivitsky v. Nye, 12
So. 2d 595 (Fla. 1943). Historically, the circuit court's jurisdiction over a minor child
encompassed broad discretion to consider and protect the child's welfare. E.g., Riesner v.
Riesner, 9 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 1942).
112. J. G. WOERNER, A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF GUARDIANSHIP 51, 63-64 (1897).
As is the case with much of American law and legal traditions, the role of the guardian ad litem
traces its origins to the common law of England where the king would issue a letter patent for the
appointment of a guardian to represent a child's interests. Ellen K. Solender, The Guardian Ad
Litem: A Valuable Representative or Illusory Safeguard?, 7 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 619, 619-20,
(1976). The sovereign's obligation to protect minors has resulted in the inherent power of the
judge in juvenile court to do likewise within the sphere of judicial proceedings. See Department
of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947, 949 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
Nevertheless, the court cannot be the advocate for the child. Brian Fraser & Harold P. Martin, An
Advocate for the Abused Child, in THE ABUSED CHILD: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO
DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES AND TREATMENT 165, 172 (Harold P. Martin ed., 1976). If the judge
becomes an active advocate for the child, impartiality is lost. E.g., In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186,
1190 n.3 (Fla. 1989); Donald G. Bross, Legal Advocacy for the Maltreated Child, TRIAL, July
1978, at 30. Pursuant to its historical, inherent, and statutory power, the court thus appoints a
guardian ad litem.
113. FLA. STAT. § 415.508(1) provides in pertinent part that: "A guardian ad litem shall be
appointed by the court at the earliest possible time to represent the child in any child abuse or
neglect judicial proceeding, whether civil or criminal." This statute has been through several
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sent and protect children in abuse and neglect proceedings.' 1 4
To effectively implement this mandate, the legislature appropriated
funds "to be administered through the State Courts System to provide
guardian ad litem representation for children .... ,,I 15 In 1982, the legis-
lature appropriated funds through the State Court Administrator's Office
for a statewide coordinated Guardian Ad Litem Program. 16 In 1985,
the Florida Supreme Court adopted written standards of operation to
govern the administration of this program." '7 Among other things, the
standards provide for the chief judge of each judicial circuit to supervise
the program and to mandate in-service training for volunteer guardians
at least ten times annually." 8 This program is part of the juvenile court
administration structure. The project director is a department head in the
court, answering directly to the chief judge of the circuit through the
court programs director.
This administrative placement guarantees close cooperation
amendments, each one broadening the scope of the guardian's role. In 1988, the legislature
clarified the guardian's role in criminal proceedings, see FLA. STAT. § 914.17 (1993), and in 1990,
the legislature affirmed the role of the guardian ad litem in dissolution/custody cases. See supra
note 2; FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(b) ("The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the
child in any proceeding as required by law."); see also In re E.F. v. Department of Health &
Rehabilitative Servs., 639 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (holding the omission of a
guardian ad litem in the termination proceeding did not rise to the level of fundamental error but
certified the question to the supreme court as a matter of great public importance). Several states
hold that failure to comply with the statute requiring the appointment of a guardian ad litem is
reversible error. Id.; In re R.M. v. Steuben County Dep't of Public Welfare, 599 N.E.2d 227, 229
(Ind. Ct. App. 1992).
114. In Florida, the guardian serves in five major roles: (1) investigator on behalf of the child;
(2) monitor of the agencies and persons who provide services to the child to ensure that court
orders are carried out and that services are provided to the family; (3) protector of the child from
the harmful effects of court proceedings; (4) spokesperson for the best interests of the child; and
(5) reporter to the court presenting information and helping the court to determine the child's best
interests. HOFFENBERG ET AL., supra note 49, at 21-22; see also FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2) (Supp.
1994); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(c).
115. Supreme Court of Florida Administrative Order, Feb. 18, 1985.
116. Certain guardian program expenses are funded through local county court budgets.
117. See, e.g., Brevard County v. Lanford, 588 So. 2d 669, 670 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
(discussing supreme court's minimal standards of operation).
118. The chief judge may designate a supervisor responsible for daily "administrative
supervision of the program." The central state office is run under the auspices of the Office of the
State Courts Administrator with the Supreme Court. The role of the Office of the State Courts
Administrator is to monitor and evaluate the program in each judicial circuit. Supreme Court
Administrative Order: Minimal Standards of Operation, State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem
Program, (Feb. 7, 1985); HOFFENBERG ET AL., supra note 49, at 20-21.
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between the judges and program staff," 19 and fosters a symbiotic12 ° rela-
tionship with the lay guardians. Judges also rely on these lay guardians,
who are considered an arm of the court,' 2' to be the judges' eyes and
ears. This relationship confers significant credibility and validity to the
guardian's recommendations in the courtroom.
Still, the lay guardian is an independent volunteer citizen who
works, not for a judge or program, but for the sheer satisfaction of
"doing good." Guardians have no special privileges. 122  They are
merely another party to the case, obligated to comply with all rules of
evidence and procedure. The guardian's relationship to the program is
that of a student to a teacher. 23 There is no doubt that this is an influen-
tial relationship. However, it is the independent guardian who has been
properly trained in children's issues from whom the judge wants to hear.
The guardian program itself does not participate in any dependency or
termination proceedings and does not make decisions for appointed
guardians. Nor does the program appear in court to exercise any power
or to represent any person.124 In practice, the judge appoints the pro-
gram which then selects an appropriate guardian based on several crite-
ria, including cultural compatibility and residential proximity. 2 '
119. But cf Jeff Schweers, Barkett Calls For Better Budgeting For Judiciary, FLA. B. NEws,
Feb. 1, 1993, at 16 (Chief Justice Barkett pointed out to the Senate Judiciary Committee the need
to shift some programs, including the guardian program, out of the court budget because the courts
have no control over the programs. She also questioned whether the program should remain
within the courts' purview, as there is an apparent conflict of interest in that relationship.). When
the guardian program was first being developed, there was talk about having the program
governed by HRS because it was not clear if the judicial branch was the proper place for this
advocacy function. The debate continues. Telephone interview with Mignon Beranck, Deputy
State Courts Administrator, Legal Affairs & Education Division of the Office of State Courts
Administrator (Aug. 9, 1994).
120. Bross, supra note 64, at 15; Fraser, supra note 2, at 29.
121. See Shahood, supra note 2, at 14.
122. In fact, guardians routinely complain of being ignored by HRS and the parents' attorney
and of always having to play "catch-up." Interview with Cindy Lerner, State of Florida Guardian
Ad Litem Program attorney, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in Miami, Fla. (Aug. 17, 1994).
123. The program serves solely an administrative function. It trains volunteers and facilitates
their appointment as guardians. The program has a full-time staff that, among other things,
screens potential guardians, trains them, reviews their written recommendations to the court, and
provides consultation. The staff also recruits and trains pro bono attorneys to represent the
guardians. The Eleventh Circuit guardian program is the largest in the nation with approximately
650 lay guardians and 350 pro bono attorneys. Interview with Joni Goodman, State of Florida
Guardian Ad Litem Program Director, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in Miami, Fla. (Mar. 5, 1994).
Though it is the largest program, there are only enough volunteers to accept about half of the
abuse or neglect cases that come before the court. Id.
124. "[T]he guardian ad litem program is only a program, the implementation of an idea or
plan .... Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cole, 574 So. 2d 160, 163 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1990).
125. Carmen Ray-Bettineski, Court-appointed Special Advocate: The Guardian Ad Litem for
Abused and Neglected Children, Juv. & FAm. CT. J., Aug. 1978, at 68; Interview with Joni
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Although guardians act independently, the question has arisen
whether they are members of the judicial branch. The nature of their
role as surrogate protector of the best interests of the child and their
appointment and training suggests that they are. The program is a part
of the judicial branch, but it is unclear whether individual guardians
should also be considered a part of the judiciary. If they are to be con-
sidered members of the judiciary because they are trained by the guard-
ian program or because they are appointed by a judge, then their
statutory authority to file a petition for dependency and their practice of
pursuing termination of parental rights creates conflict of interest and
separation of powers dilemmas. To clarify this issue requires a careful
analysis of a termination of parental rights proceeding and the role,
responsibilities, and duties of the guardian ad litem.
A termination proceeding does not comfortably fall within the usu-
ally understood parameters of either a civil or criminal case. 126 It seems
best characterized as "quasi-prosecutorial." Although the purpose of the
action is expressly not to punish the person creating the condition of
dependency, 127 the complete and irrevocable termination of the rights of
a natural parent to his or her child is undeniably a significant and intru-
sive exercise of state power. Because of this consequence, which neces-
sarily entails the deprivation of certain liberties, the U.S. Supreme Court
has held that due process requires the state to support its allegations by
at least clear and convincing evidence. Having concluded that the pre-
ponderance standard falls short of meeting the demands of due process
and that the reasonable doubt standard is not required, the Supreme
Court adopted an intermediate burden of proof that strikes what it
believes to be a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the
Goodman, State of Florida Guardian Ad Litem Program Director, Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in
Miami, Fla. (Aug. 8, 1994). But see Cole, 574 So. 2d at 163 (trial court in dependency action
cannot appoint program to designate guardian ad litem or indirectly delegate to program or its
circuit director the judicial power to appoint the guardian, but should directly appoint guardian
itself based on a list of qualified persons provided by the circuit director).
126. The United States Supreme Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 762 (1982), has
stated that "the factfinding stage of a state-initiated permanent neglect proceeding bears many of
the indicia of a criminal trial" because of the following factors:
The Commissioner of Social Services charges the parents with permanent neglect.
They are served by summons. The factfinding hearing is conducted pursuant to
formal rules of evidence. The State, the parents, and the child are all represented by
counsel .... The attorneys submit documentary evidence, and call witnesses who
are subject to cross-examination.... [T]he judge then determines whether the State
has proved the statutory elements [by the proper burden of proof7.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Although this is state action, these elements are present
in civil trials as well.
127. FLA. STAT. § 39.404(2) (Supp. 1994). But see Lassiter v. Department of Social 'Servs., 42
U.S. 18, 40 (1981) ("removal of a child from the parents is a penalty as great, if not greater, than a
criminal penalty") (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 95-1386, at 22 (1978)).
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concerns of the state. 128
Another unique fact about the termination process in Florida is that
indigent parents are held to have a constitutional right to counsel at state
expense. 129 This right derives not from the Sixth Amendment's right to
counsel, but from the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due pro-
cess. 130  Additionally, the compulsory nature of a termination is more
like a criminal than a civil trial. For instance, if the parents fail to com-
ply substantially with the case plan before the eighteenth month judicial
review, HRS is mandated to file for termination of parental rights.' 31
In contrast, a termination proceeding is civil in nature because any-
one with knowledge can file a petition to terminate parental rights. 1
32
Trial is without a jury and the adjudication focuses not on a person but a
relationship. Liberty interests of the parents themselves are not at issue.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that the custodian of a child
may not invoke the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion to resist an order of the juvenile court to produce the child.133
What seems to emerge from the statutes and common law is the
idea that a termination proceeding is permissive state action based on the
doctrine of parens patriae and that either the executive branch (i.e.,
128. Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747-48. The Supreme Court held a clear and convincing evidence
standard "adequately conveys to the factfinder the level of subjective certainty about his factual
conclusions necessary to satisfy due process." Id. at 768-70. The Florida Supreme Court,
however, had adopted the "clear and convincing" standard long before the federal system. Torres
v. Van Eepoel, 98 So. 2d 735, 737 (Fla. 1957).
129. The Florida Supreme Court recognized the important and fundamental interests at stake in
termination of parental rights proceedings and has held "a constitutional right to counsel
necessarily arises where the proceedings can result in permanent loss of parental custody ...
[C]ounsel will always be required where permanent termination of custody might result." In re
D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 87, 91 (Fla. 1980). See also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.515. This is more protection
than the United States Supreme Court requires in these cases. In Lassiter, the Court held that the
appointment of counsel in termination proceedings may be determined by the state courts on a
case-by-case basis. 452 U.S. at 31-32.
130. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d at 89.
131. FLA. STAT. § 39.454(2) (Supp. 1994).
132. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.461, 39.464. The grant of this right-of-action to persons with
knowledge has been held constitutional. In re C.B., 561 So. 2d 663, 666 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990).
Reversing a lower court decision finding section 39.461(1) unconstitutional, the court stated:
We hold that the State has a sufficiently compelling interest in the welfare of
children to authorize someone with knowledge of facts sufficient to terminate
parental rights to bring that issue before a judge even if (particularly when) HRS
does not agree.... [W]e think it appropriate to construe the term [any other person
who has knowledge] to mean someone who is in a peculiar position so that such
knowledge can be reasonably inferred; for example, the judge familiar with the file,
the guardian or attorney ....
Id. See also Padgett v. Pettis, 445 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984), dismissed, 450 So. 2d
487 (Fla. 1984) (grandparents have standing to seek declaration of dependency under FLA. STAT.
§ 39.404).
133. Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555-56 (1990).
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HRS) or the judiciary (through the guardian and an attorney representing
the guardian) may carry these actions forward. Although the law man-
dates HRS to pursue termination of parental rights under certain circum-
stances,' 3 4 it is unclear whether it is a required party or the only party
permitted to litigate termination cases. Florida law requires that an
attorney for HRS must represent the state in termination proceedings, 135
but the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure establish that HRS is merely
a discretionary party.136 The Florida Supreme Court has held that legal
representation on behalf of HRS is required at every stage of juvenile
dependency proceedings. 3 7 In practice, children and their guardians
have sought termination of parental rights without an HRS attorney pres-
ent. 138 In substance, however, HRS is a participant in the proceedings
every time an HRS social worker testifies on behalf of the agency in
favor of termination. 139
Prior to the Florida Supreme Court's administrative order in 1985
requiring the court to appoint guardians, the Fifth and Second District
Courts of Appeal suggested that the primary responsibility for assuring a
child's representation through the procurement of a guardian ad litem
rested with HRS. 4 ° The Supreme Court of Wisconsin has gone so far as
to assert that the guardian ad litem is a "state actor" because its authority
derives from the state's parens patriae power and is purely statutory.' 41
134. See supra note 131.
135. FLA. STAT. § 39.014 (1993). The statute mandates that for dependency cases "an attorney
for the [D]epartment of [Health and Rehabilitative Services] shall represent the state. The
department may contract with outside counsel or the state attorney, pursuant to § 287.059, for
legal representation .. " Id.
136. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a)(b) "[T]he terms 'party' and 'parties' shall include the petitioner,
the child, the parent, the guardian ad litem where appointed, and the custodian .... The state
attorney's office or the Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services may become a party
upon notice to all other parties and the court." Id. (emphasis added).
137. In re Advisory Opinion HRS Nonlawyer Counselor, 547 So. 2d 909 (Fla. 1989)
(Overburdened by approximately 100,000 reports of abused and neglected children, HRS
permitted lay counselors to engage in the practice of law by drafting legal documents and
representing HRS in court in uncontested dependency proceedings.). See FLA. STAT. § 39.014
(1993) (HRS may contract with outside counsel or the state attorney for legal representation.).
138. E.g., Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Kahn, 639 So. 2d 689, 690 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1994) (HRS did not initiate or prosecute the termination proceedings); Kingsley v. Kingsley,
623 So. 2d 780, 783-84 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (child cannot petition court in his own name because
he lacks requisite legal capacity, however, an adult person of reasonable judgment and integrity
may conduct the litigation for the minor); see also Blair, supra note 38, at 22 ("The indifference
and inaction of the Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services (HRS) left Gregory
Kingsley, then 1 I years old, with no choice but to act for himself.").
139. In re A.S., 118 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2221, 2228 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1990).
140. In re M.P., 453 So. 2d 85, 87 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984), rev. denied, 472 So. 2d 732 (Fla.
1985); In re R.W., 409 So. 2d 1069, 1070 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 418 So. 2d 1279 (Fla.
1982).
141. In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 71 (Wis. 1992).
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The guardian's duty is to assist those who are defenseless and who are
of special concern to the government.'4 2 Moreover, guardians ad litem
are legally obligated to do everything within their power to insure a
judgment that is in the child's best interest. 43
The statutes recognize that a protector of the "defenseless" must be
an advocate. In particular, Florida law makes many references to the
guardian's participation in proceedings as the representative of the child-
party. In fact, in termination proceedings the guardian is a party' 44 and
is entitled to receive all process and service. 5 A guardian is repre-
sented by a program staff attorney or a pro bono attorney. 146 An attor-
ney is necessary to represent the guardian because, as a party, the
guardian is entitled to present the case, examine and cross-examine wit-
nesses, submit evidence, and prepare motions or petitions for relief or
appeal from orders or judgments. "17 The statute is silent, however, on
whether guardians can independently litigate termination actions. In
practice, attorneys for guardians have litigated such actions, concur-
rently representing both the guardian and HRS when their interests are
aligned. In cases when HRS and the guardian both agree that termina-
tion of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, the question
remains whether HRS can waive its presence in the courtroom without
violating the separation of powers doctrine. 148
142. Bross, supra note 64, at 14.
143. Fraser, supra note 2, at 29; see also Bross, supra note 64, at 15.
144. FLA. STAT. § 39.01(71) (Supp. 1994) (" 'Party,' for purposes of a shelter proceeding,
dependency proceeding, or termination of parental rights proceeding, means the parent of the
child, the petitioner, the department, the guardian ad litem when one has been appointed, and the
child."). See also FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.210(a).
145. FLA. STAT. § 39.465(2)(d); see also id. § 39.462(l)(a)(7).
146. The guardian ad litem is not an attorney for the child. FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.215(0.
147. E.g., In re M.S., 623 So. 2d 1239, 1240 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) (upholding termination of
parental rights where guardian ad litem "showed by clear and convincing evidence that the
children had been adjudicated dependent"). See Nancy Neraas, Comment, The Non-Lawyer
Guardian Ad Litem in Child Abuse and Neglect Proceedings: The King County, Washington
Experience, 58 WASH. L. REV. 853, 863-64 (1983). The regulations implementing the Federal
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act prohibit the guardian from being the attorney
responsible for presenting the evidence alleging child abuse or neglect. 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14(g)
(1986); In re Christina D., 525 A.2d 1306 (R.I. 1987) (court-appointed guardian ad litem had
standing to intervene in adoption proceedings); In re Jamie "Ti", 599 N.Y.S. 2d 892, 893-94
(App. Div. 1993) (child in abuse proceeding entitled to effective assistance of counsel).
148. An agency having temporary legal custody of the child is not prevented, through its
attorney, from waiving its presence at the termination hearing. In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230, 1233-
34 (D.C. 1993). Any party can waive its presence at a proceeding. Such a waiver, however, does
not constitute a withdrawal from the action and the party remains bound by the proceeding. See
Arrington v. Robertson, 114 F.2d 821, 823 (3d Cir. 1940).
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V. SEPARATION OF POWERS
Time and again the United States Supreme Court has reaffirmed the
importance in our constitutional scheme of the separation of governmen-
tal powers into the three coordinate branches.' 49 The Framers of the
Federal Constitution viewed the separation of powers doctrine as the
central guarantee of a just government. 150 Similarly, Article II, Section
3 of the Florida Constitution151 provides: "The powers of the state gov-
ernment shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial
branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers
appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided
herein."' 52 This mandate encompasses two fundamental prohibitions
directed at constitutionally prescribed powers. First, no branch may
encroach upon the power of another. 5 3 Second, no branch may dele-
gate its constitutional power to another branch.' 54
The standard for determining whether one branch has unconstitu-
tionally encroached on the power of another is whether a power apper-
tains exclusively to one branch. 155 A power appertains to a branch if it
is expressly or explicitly granted in the Constitution. 56 Florida's Con-
stitution is silent regarding the protection of children and therefore does
not grant exclusive power over children's welfare to any branch.
Accordingly, even if a court-appointed guardian stands in the same
shoes constitutionally as the statewide guardian program, there would
149. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693 (1988).
150. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
151. The Florida legislature has declared that the State of Florida intends to have a policy that
separates the powers among the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of the government.
FLA. STAT. § 20.02 (1993). The statute indicates that:
(1) The state constitution contemplates the separation of powers within state
government among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
government. The legislative branch has the broad purpose of determining policies
and programs and reviewing program performance. The executive branch has the
purpose of executing the programs and policies adopted by the legislature and of
making policy recommendations to the legislature. The judicial branch has the
purpose of determining the constitutional propriety of the policies and programs and
of adjudicating any conflicts arising from the interpretation or application of the
laws.
Id.
152. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3.
153. E.g., Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E and F, 589 So. 2d 260, 268-69 (Fla. 1991) (finding
FLA. STAT. § 216.221(2) unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers because it
delegated to the executive branch the legislature's exclusive authority to appropriate state funds
and make decisions regarding the purposes for which public funds may or may not be applied).
154. Chiles, 589 So. 2d at 264; cf. Broward County v. LaRose, 505 So. 2d 422, 423 (Fla. 1987)
(holding that legislature can create agencies with quasi-judicial powers but it cannot authorize
them to "exercise powers that are fundamentally judicial in nature").
155. State ex rel. Young v. Duval County 79 So. 692 1698 (Fla. 1918).
156. Id.
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only be a separation of powers issue if the power to bring, maintain, and
litigate termination of parental rights actions appertains exclusively to
the executive branch.
Florida law does not grant exclusive power over the rights of chil-
dren to any branch. HRS is an agency created by statute and it possesses
only those powers given to it by the legislature.' 57 HRS is not granted
exclusive power concerning the rights of children either in its enabling
act or in the statutory provisions relating to juveniles. 158 Because
neither the Constitution nor the statutes award HRS exclusive power
over children, such powers are granted, if at all, by specific statute.' 59
For example, in 1969 the legislature expressly granted HRS power over
children's rights involved in dependency proceedings, 60 and in 1987 the
legislature authorized HRS to perform duties involving termination of
parental rights. 161 Neither statutory grant of power is exclusive.
The legislature has also given the judiciary important powers in
child welfare matters. Numerous statutory provisions vest power over
matters relating to children in the circuit courts.' 62 The legislative intent
embodied in these laws is "that the court and not the agency have pri-
mary responsibility in custody matters."'' 63  Statutes have also recog-
nized the court's inherent jurisdiction"6 over child welfare issues by
making it the court's responsibility to appoint a guardian in cases
involving child abuse or neglect.' 65 Thus, the judiciary has both inher-
ent and statutory authority to take actions necessary to protect children's
welfare. In addition, the executive branch, acting through HRS, also has
the statutory power to protect the welfare of children. The judicial and
157. Family Servs. v. State, 319 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
158. See Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 947, 948 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983).
159. Family Servs., 319 So. 2d at 76.
160. Ch. 69-268, § 1, Laws of Fla. (codified at FLA. STAT. § 409.145 (1969)).
161. Ch. 87-289, § 9, Laws of Fla. (codified at FLA. STAT § 39.461 (1987)).
162. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.46(2) (1993) ("circuit court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction of a proceeding involving termination of parental rights"); id. § 39.462 (process for
termination of parental rights); id. § 39.465 (right to counsel and appointment of guardian ad
litem); id. § 39.466 (advisory hearing); and id. § 39.467(1) ("the Court shall consider the grounds
for termination and manifest best interest of the child."). See also id. § 415.508(1) (appointment
of guardian ad litem for abused or neglected child).
163. Department of Health & Rehab. Servs. v. Brooke, 573 So. 2d 363, 369 (Fla. 1st DCA
1991) (clear legislative intent evidenced in Chapter 39 is "that the court and not the agency [HRS]
have primary responsibility in custody matters") (citing Family Services v. State, 319 So. 2d 72,
75 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975).
164. Even without express statutory authority, courts have inherent jurisdiction to take those
actions that are necessary to protect a child's welfare. E.g., Waters v. Waters, 578 So. 2d 874
(Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hollis, 429 So. 2d 947, 949
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983).
165. FLA. STAT. § 415.508(l) (1993).
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executive branches, therefore, have overlapping and often concurrent 66
jurisdiction over children.' 67
While the separation of powers principle prohibits any branch from
usurping an exclusive power granted to another branch, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never held that the U.S. Constitution requires the
three branches of the federal government to "operate with absolute inde-
pendence." 68 However, under Florida law the application of this princi-
ple when the powers of the branches overlap has been the subject of
much controversy. 69  The Fifth District Court of Appeal determined
that when such an overlap occurs with respect to child welfare issues,
each branch may constitutionally proceed with its legislative mandate:
[A] number of Florida Statutes delegate power over matters relating
to child custody and commitment proceedings to both HRS and to the
circuit courts. When such an overlap of powers occurs, the legitimate
exercise of powers of one branch, in this case the judiciary, cannot be
said to violate the doctrine of separation of powers.
17 0
In addition to child custody matters, filing a termination petition
appears to be a legitimate overlapping power,' 7' given to both HRS and
the guardian ad litem.' 72 Florida law gives standing to bring a civil
cause of action not only to the guardian, but to any person with knowl-
edge of the facts. 173 The fact that HRS may also maintain such an action
does not mean that this provision invades a constitutionally prescribed
166. For example, both HRS and the guardian ad litem have been conferred with the authority
to file petitions alleging child abuse with the court. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.461, 39.464 (Supp. 1994).
167. E.g., In re A.B., 444 So. 2d 981 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); In re T.G.T., 433 So. 2d 11, 12
(Fla. 1st DCA 1983); In re J.R.T., 427 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
168. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 693-94 (1988) (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418*
U.S. 683, 707 (1974)).
169. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Hollis, 439 So. 2d 447, 948 (Fla. 1st
DCA 1983). The existence of overlapping and often concurrent jurisdiction over children by the
judiciary and executive branches has resulted in a number of cases involving the separation of
powers clause. Several of these cases arose when the court exercised that power contrary to the
wishes of HRS. See, e.g., In re J.S., 444 So. 2d 1148 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984) (ordering HRS to assist
mother in instituting a paternity action against putative father to establish a duty of support not
violative of separation of powers); Hollis, 439 So. 2d at 948 (directing HRS to file a petition for
permanent commitment of minor children did not violate separation of powers). See also In re
C.B., 561 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (rejecting HRS's constitutional challenge to filing of
petition to terminate parental rights by guardian with personal knowledge of facts); In re J.R.T.,
427 So. 2d 251, 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983) (rejecting contention that court could not initiate
proceedings for termination of parental rights).
170. Hollis, 439 So. 2d at 948 (citations omitted).
171. See In re J.S., 444 So. 2d at 1150; Hollis, 439 So. 2d at 948; In re C.B., 561 So. 2d at 666.
172. See FLA. STAT. §§ 39.461, 39.464 (Supp. 1993).
173. FLA. STAT. § 39.464 (Supp. 1994); In re A.S., 118 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2221, 2228 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1990) ("the idea of private citizen enforcement of public rights is embedded in our
constitutional system") (quoting United States ex. rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F.
Supp. 1084, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 1989)).
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executive power or any power that is fundamentally and exclusively
executive in nature. 74 Even though authority in this area is overlapping
and concurrent, the executive branch still retains sufficient mechanisms
for control so there is no unlawful encroachment upon its role of insur-
ing that the laws are faithfully executed. However, because HRS is the
primary party responsible for terminating parental rights, problems arise
when guardians, pursuant to their authority to protect children, take the
lead in fulfilling the legislative goal of removing children from foster
care by litigating termination cases. Because a termination proceeding
is such a unique hybrid of criminal and civil elements, one could argue
that the guardian is usurping the executive branch's exclusive function
to charge and prosecute.
The Florida Supreme Court has expressly held that the judiciary
may not interfere with the discretionary executive function of the prose-
cutor. 17 5 The basic right protected by the separation of the powers of the
judicial and executive branches is the right to an impartial hearing
before an impartial tribunal. 176 The Florida Supreme Court recognizes
that "[t]he fundamental concern of keeping the individual branches sepa-
rate is that the fusion of the powers of any two branches into the same
department would ultimately result in the destruction of liberty.' 77 The
risk of allowing the guardian to independently litigate a termination pro-
ceeding is that the judicial branch might unite with the executive branch
and thereby endanger the court's ability to objectively weigh the evi-
dence. Judges, now holding the judicial and executive powers, could
enforce the law as they choose and "behave with all the violence of an
oppressor." 78 On the other hand, these matters are in juvenile court,
and HRS is not the state attorney. To the contrary, a court may interfere
with executive discretion and order HRS to perform its duty, if HRS has
disregarded that duty.' 79
174. Cf Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 695 (1988) (in a federal context, holding
independent counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, which allows for a
court-appointed counselor to investigate and prosecute certain high-ranking government officials
for violations of federal criminal laws, did not work any judicial usurpation of properly executive
functions). "[T]he power to appoint inferior officers such as independent counsel is not in itself
an 'executive' function in the constitutional sense, at least when Congress has exercised its power
to vest the appointment of an inferior office in the 'courts of Law.' " Id. at 695.
175. State v. Bloom, 497 So. 2d 2, 3 (Fla. 1986).
176. See Ford v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 436 So. 2d 305, 307 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983).
177. Chiles v. Children A, B, C, D, E, & F, 589 So. 2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1991).
178. David A. Martland, Note, Justice Without Favor: Due Process and Separation of
Executive and Judicial Powers in State Government, 94 YALE L.J. 1675, 1677-78 and n.22 (1985)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison)); see also Ward v. Village of
Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 61-62 (1972) (reversing traffic conviction where mayor served as
judge).
179. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Kahn, 639 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 5th DCA
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At least one court has held that allowing the guardian ad litem to
initiate and pursue termination proceedings does not violate due pro-
cess.180 The identity of the petitioner does not alter the basic procedures
that govern the conduct of these proceedings. Unlike a criminal case in
which a public prosecutor must disclose evidence favorable to the
accused and refrain from prosecution in the absence of probable
cause," s' HRS owes no special duties to the parents. When a guardian
substitutes for HRS, none of the procedural protections are eliminated.
The guardian is subject to, and must comply with, all the necessary rules
applicable to all parties in termination proceedings.
Under Florida law, parents are represented by appointed counsel
throughout the dependency and termination proceedings, a privilege the
United States Supreme Court has held is not required in all cases. 8 2
The parents are provided the opportunity to engage in full discovery, to
receive notice of all matters and to be heard on any of the issues. As
dictated by the United States Supreme Court, the grounds for termina-
tion must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. 8 3 Unless the
parents can demonstrate that some prejudice actually occurred, HRS's
failure to appear should not destroy the kind of liberty contemplated by
the constitutional mandate of separate powers and due process. 8
4
In Florida, as in many other states, guardians ad litem, represented
by pro bono attorneys, routinely petition and litigate termination pro-
ceedings. 85 Courts have consistently assumed that the statutory provi-
1994). In Kahn, the court ordered HRS to have a staff meeting to determine whether to terminate
parental rights or keep the child in long term relative placement. HRS moved to terminate
supervision but the trial court denied the motion. The guardian ultimately petitioned to terminate
parental rights and during litigation called an expert to testify. Id. at 690. Even though HRS did
not initiate or litigate the termination proceedings, the court held it liable for the expert's fee
because HRS is responsible for providing protective services to children and the expert fee in this
case was deemed a necessary cost incurred on behalf of the child. Id. at 691.
180. In re L.H., 634 A.2d 1230 (D.C. 1993).
181. See State v. Kinder, 701 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1988).
182. Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-34 (1981) (court appointment of
counsel for indigent parents is not always required in termination proceedings where parental
rights are threatened). But see FLA. STAT. § 39.465(1) (1993) (court appointment of counsel for
indigent parents is required at each stage of the termination proceedings).
183. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768-69 (1982).
184. See In re Pasco, 389 N.W.2d 188, 191 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) ("There is no support in
case law for the proposition that a prosecutor must be present at [a termination] hearing .... In
the absence of an affirmative showing of prejudice .... the prosecutor's failure to appear [does
not] constitute reversible error.).
185. In Florida, for instance, "based upon a combination of statistics ... approximately 200
termination of parental rights cases were handled by attorneys who represented both the guardian
and HRS." Interview with Kathleen M. Smith, Esq., Managing Attorney, Put Something Back,
Children's Pro Bono Project, in Miami, Fla. (Mar. 15, 1994). In D.C. Superior Court, almost all
termination of parental rights proceedings over the past 12 years have been litigated by guardians
ad litem. In re A.S., 118 Daily. Wash. L. Rep. 2221, n.1 (D.C. 1990).
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sions which authorized guardians to file termination petitions also
permitted them to litigate the petition.1 86 Before the Simms appeal, no
one in Florida had questioned the guardian's simultaneous actions on
behalf of both the state and the child.
87
Florida law expressly authorizes a guardian ad litem to initiate pro-
ceedings for termination of parental rights by filing a petition. 8' The
logical interpretation of such statutory provisions is that the authoriza-
tion also encompasses the right to finish what the guardian started in the
child's best interest-the maintenance and litigation of the termination
petition.189 Statutes must be construed to avoid an interpretation which
leads to absurd results. 190 An interpretation of provisions authorizing
only the filing of termination petitions, but not their litigation, seems
senseless. A contrary interpretation is inconsistent with the best inter-
ests of children since it might easily deprive them of meaningful access
to the courts.
The state's interest is substantially served by the guardian's pursuit
of termination of parental rights. The primary function of the Adoption
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 is to encourage stability in the
lives of children who have been adjudicated dependent and to increase
the opportunities for prompt adoptive placement for such children. Until
now, HRS has been unable to shoulder its full burden under the stat-
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also permit guardians ad litem to bring suit:
Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general
guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue
or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent
person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend
or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant
or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such
other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person.
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c).
186. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.461, 39.464 (Supp. 1994).
187. The D.C. Superior Court has held that a termination petition may be filed and the hearing
litigated by a private attorney acting as guardian ad litem for a child without any active
involvement on behalf of the state agency without violating due process or the separation of
powers doctrine. In re A.S., 118 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2228-29).
188. FLA. STAT. §§ 39.461, 39.464 (Supp. 1994).
189. Cf. Graham v. State, 372 So. 2d 1363, 1365 (Fla. 1979) (appointed public defenders are
authorized to file federal habeas petitions arising from authorized representation, although not
expressly sanctioned by statute). In 1979, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY defined guardian ad litem
as "a special guardian appointed by the court to prosecute or defend, in behalf of an infant or
incompetent, a suit to which he is a party, and such guardian is considered an officer of the court
to represent the interest of the infant or incompetent in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
635 (5th ed. 1979). However, in 1990, the definition was changed to, "a special guardian
appointed by the court in which a particular litigation is pending to represent an infant, ward or
unborn person in that particular litigation," thereby excluding the "prosecute or defend" language.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 706 (6th ed. 1990).
190. See, e.g., City of St. Petersburg v. Siebold, 48 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. 1950); Drost v.
Department of Envtl. Regulation, 559 So. 2d 1154, 1156 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989).
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ute.' 91 The guardian's ability to pursue termination of parental rights
benefits HRS by facilitating necessary termination actions that might not
otherwise occur because of HRS's budgetary and bureaucratic limita-
tions. Consequently, the guardian is in an ideal position to carry out the
federal and state policies of quickly finding permanent placement for
children in foster care.
As a result of the Simms decision, HRS and the guardian may be
represented simultaneously by the same attorney. However, when an
attorney attempts to represent both the state and the child, another ques-
tion-one of conflicting interest-must be addressed. For example, is
the attorney's duty of loyalty and fidelity and the duty to exercise
independent professional judgment compromised?
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct generally prohibit a law-
yer from representing clients with conflicting interests unless the lawyer
reasonably believes the representation will not adversely affect the rela-
tionship with the other client, and each client consents after consulta-
tion. 92 The rule requires explanation of the "implications of the
common representation and the advantages and risks involved."' 193 In
termination proceedings, an advocate's options are limited. Conse-
quently, the guardian will often have a position consistent with one of
the parties and in opposition to the other.
In many cases, the guardian and HRS agree that termination is in
the child's best interests. When the interests of the child and the state
are aligned and both HRS and the guardian consent to the dual represen-
tation, there may be no conflict problem. There are some pitfalls await-
ing an attorney representing both HRS and the guardian, however,
including the conflict between the duty to protect HRS from negligent
exposure and the desire of the guardian to "make a case" against a par-
ent. In addition, HRS's duty as a minister of justice may require bring-
ing forth evidence favoring the parent that would hurt the guardian's
case or the guardian may be tempted to overlook a failure by HRS to
provide necessary services to the parents or child because this would
expose the guardian's failure to properly monitor HRS. These conflicts
suggest that a court-appointed guardian should not represent HRS when
the guardian's attorney actively pursues termination of parental rights.
Potential conflicts, however, do not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers, nor do conflicts prohibit the guardian from independently pursu-
ing the termination of parental rights.
The parents' fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and
191. See supra note 90.
192. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.7(a) (1994).
193. Id. at 1.7(b).
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management of their children is subject to the overriding entitlement of
children to an environment free of physical and emotional violence.
9 4
Thus, guardians must continue to pursue termination after having peti-
tioned for it in order to avoid creating a system in which the protection
of a child's right to be free from abuse and neglect is at the sole discre-
tion of a state agency. Maltreated children have the right to be free from
such harm, and to obtain that freedom even if HRS is unwilling or
unable to act.1 95 Because a child can often act only through a guardian
ad litem, a limitation on the rights of a guardian is a limitation on the
rights of a child.
The serious potential for these conflict of interest problems sug-
gests that the legislature should make the Guardian Ad Litem Program
an entity of the executive branch. Under such a regime, guardian attor-
neys would be analogous to state attorneys and public defenders. Alter-
natively, the legislature could place the guardian program in HRS, but
this would only increase the load on an already overburdened system.
The national trend toward developing family courts is an excellent
model for improving the system to better deal with family problems,
which rarely find satisfactory results in an adversarial atmosphere. 196
However, the creation of ancillary support programs operating as a part
of the court system further blurs the distinction between the executive
and judicial functions. 197
VI. CONCLUSION
As society becomes increasingly more complex, the problems of
maintaining order and justice become correspondingly complex. The
ways by which we perceive and correct these problems are too often
accomplished by patchwork and stopgap measures, continually reinvent-
ing the wheel so that the system can continue to limp along without
much disruption to the principles upon which it was founded. The
194. Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d 565, 570 (Fla. 1991).
195. Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So. 2d 780 (5th DCA 1993), rev. denied, 634 So. 2d 625 (Fla.
1994). The lesson from Kingsley is that if the state has failed to provide a remedy for a child, that
child, if old and sophisticated enough to assert his or her wishes, may engage an adult
representative to pursue a remedy. If the state fails to provide a remedy for a child too young or
too timid to assert the right to be free from abuse, and the court-appointed guardian is
constitutionally unable to protect these rights, these children have no remedy at law.
196. See generally Page, supra note 38.
197. Id. at 43. "In order for a family division to operate effectively, it needs: (I) court-
connected mediation services; (2) home assessment services for custody cases; (3) sufficient staff
to coordinate the family divisions operation; and (4) sufficient staff to operate enforcement of
support services." Id. (quoting In re: Report of the Commission on Family Courts, 588 So. 2d 586
(Fla. 1991)).
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trouble with this approach is that the problems always fold back upon
themselves.
It does little good to keep "fixing" the legal procedures for the care
of maltreated children if the root causes are not addressed. It is the very
social and political foundations of society that must be corrected. These
involve the economic and educational opportunities that are so fre-
quently denied to that portion of society from which so many of the
most severe and urgent cases of child maltreatment arise.
Such a social-political approach requires a revised conceptual
model upon which the best interests of the child is based. This is not to
suggest, however, that court-appointed guardians should stop represent-
ing children or litigating for termination of parental rights where needed.
Until a more enlightened paradigm can be implemented, the guardian ad
litem serves as the strongest safeguard for the rights of maltreated
children.
H. LILA HUBERT*
* With deepest gratitude to all the children's advocates who took time out to share with me
their ideas and work. Especially I would like to thank Cindy Lerner, Esq., Helen Stone, Esq. and
Joni Goodman, Director, at the 1 th Circuit Guardian Ad Litem Program of Florida, Stephen
Corse, Esq. and Eric Roth, Esq., pro bono attorneys at White & Case in Miami, and Michael
Ward, Esq., pro bono attorney at Swidler & Berlin in Washington, D.C.
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